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1. Introduction
1.1. What are concepts?
Concepts are the framework underlying not just language but unspoken thought. Th ey 
may roughly be taken equally either as units of structured thought or as the ability/-ies 
to possess and employ structured thought – I take the two formulations as equivalent1; 
such that such thought is2 (a) systematic (the same concepts can be employed system-
atically across contexts); (b) productive (a fi nite number can be combined and recom-
bined in unboundedly many ways); (c) compositional (concepts build on one another, 
forming complex concepts and, at least in the case of certain conceptual agents, prop-
ositions3); (d) intentional as per Brentano (concepts are always about something: they 
have a content4) for an identifi able agent (i.e. they are never free-fl oating); (e) re-iden-
tifi able (they take a particular form, which might be called their expression, that is dis-
tinct from their content), (f) ‘spontaneous’ per Kant’s terminology [what Jesse Prinz 
(2004: 197) calls “being under the agent’s endogenous control”]5; and (g) pace Jerry 
Fodor (2008), subject to revision (if not, in fact, as I will argue, in a state of constant if 
incremental change). Th at fi nal point will be the focus of this paper. 
Alternatively, concepts can be characterized as the ability/-ies by which certain 
agents are able to respond fl exibly to their environment so that, presented with the 
‘same’ circumstances on diff erent occasions, they can make diff erent choices, based 
on an active consideration of their past experiences as well as anticipation of experi-
ences to come. Critically, that fl exibility depends both on being suffi  ciently stable to 
be relied upon and suffi  ciently dynamic to be able to adapt.
1 Th at is, concepts are both things we possess and employ and something that we do. 
I leave aside for the present paper the endlessly debated question of whether concepts are 
representations or (non-representational) abilities except to suggest that, as I have argued 
elsewhere (Parthemore 2010, 2011a, 2013b), they are most properly understood as both: 
representations when we stop and refl ect on them, (non-representational) abilities when we 
just get on with possessing and employing them non-refl ectively.
2 For similar lists, see Prinz 2004, Ch. 1; Fodor 1998, Ch. 1; Chrisley, Parthemore 2007.
3 Note that propositions can be interpreted as beliefs: e.g. the proposition “it is raining” can 
be read as the implied propositional attitude “I believe that it is raining”. Th e term “proposition” 
gets used in many, subtly diff erent ways in the literature, some of which assume linguistic 
framing or expression and some of which do not. I am not assuming linguistic framing or 
expression, meaning that propositionally structured thought, as expressive of certain complex 
concepts, may be available to non-linguistic agents.
4 What they are about, what they refer to – their content – can be distinguished from what 
form they take in the mind of the agent possessing and employing them, allowing the agent to 
reidentify and reuse them appropriately. Th e latter is the equivalent of semiotic expression.
5 In other words, concepts are not simply given passively to the conceptual agent. Th e 
conceptual agent is not free to do with them as she pleases – the control is not absolute – but 
she can substantively shape and reshape them.
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1.2. What are signs?
Th e working defi nition of concepts I have off ered is consistent with the way many 
others have defi ned signs: e.g., Charles Sanders Peirce (who at some points takes 
signs so broadly as to include almost anything) writes (1998: 82–83):
A sign is something which stands for another thing to a mind […]. On the fi rst 
place, it must have characters which shall enable us to distinguish it from other 
objects. In the second place, it must be aff ected in some way by the object which it 
signifi ed or at least something about it must vary as a consequence of a real causa-
tion with some variation of its object.
Göran Sonesson and his student Sara Lenninger off er a defi nition of sign (Sonesson, 
Lenninger forthcoming; see also Sonesson 2012, 2003) that is in its spirit very close to 
the one I am off ering for conceptually structured thought, and so, for my purposes, 
more useful:
Any sign must possess the following properties: it contains (at least) two parts 
(expression and content) and is as a whole relatively independent of that for which 
it stands (the referent); these parts are diff erentiated, from the point of view of 
the subjects involved in the semiotic process […]; there is a double asymmetry 
between the two parts, because one part, expression, is more directly experienced 
than the other; and because the other part, content, is more in focus than the 
other; the sign itself is subjectively diff erentiated from the referent, and the refer-
ent is more indirectly known than any part of the sign.
In a similar vein, Lenninger (2012: 1) writes that signs “imply relations between 
ex pression and content for an interpreting subject. Th at is to say that signs involve 
something that is ‘given’ to someone (the expression); and, further, that this ‘given’ 
meaning draws attention to something else: i.e., the content”. Th e diff erence  – as 
the quotations might be seen to imply – is that they could be understood as requir-
ing the agent possessing and employing the sign to be consciously aware of doing 
so. Th at is, the diff erentiation between expression and content that my defi nition 
of concepts allows to remain implicit to the agent [potentially more knowing how 
than knowing that, to borrow Gilbert Ryle’s (1949) famous distinction] becomes, for 
them, at least partially or at least potentially explicit.
For purposes of this paper, I prefer to understand concepts as essentially co-
extensive with consciousness (I assume that most theories of consciousness at least 
implicitly assume that consciousness, to qualify as consciousness, should be concep-
tually structured, although I will not argue the point here) and interpret signs rather 
more narrowly as per Zlatev 2002, as conceptually mediated attempts at communica-
tion that are at least semi-conventionalized, of which language forms a subset. Th e 
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recipient could be another agent, or it could equally be oneself. On the other hand, 
sign use does assume a social context. As the paper will make clear, I take concepts 
to be prior to signs and sign use ontogenetically and phylogenetically, in this sense; 
while signs and sign use are likewise prior to language – with considerable inspira-
tion from Jordan Zlatev’s (2009) semiotic hierarchy of life ← consciousness ← signs ← 
language.
In the end, how narrowly or broadly one interprets signs does not matter for pur-
poses of this paper. If, on a very broad reading of signs,6 concepts and signs amount 
to more or less the same thing, then a discussion of the change and development of 
concepts on multiple time scales simply will be another way of looking at the change 
and development of signs on multiple time scales, using a slightly diff erent toolset 
and vocabulary. If, on a narrower reading of signs such as I prefer, concepts are prior 
to and provide part of the necessary and, indeed, integral foundation to signs, then 
an understanding of the change and development of concepts should be expected to 
shed light on the change and development of signs, which concepts make possible. 
On this narrower reading, the development of sign use on multiple time scales may 
not be expected necessarily to recapitulate the corresponding development of con-
cepts – not precisely – but there should be a close relation, just as a key ingredient in 
a recipe has much to say about the fi nal product.
1.3. Concepts: further desiderata
1.3.1. Publicity
In off ering my desiderata for concepts, I quite deliberately choose not to include 
publicity: the idea that concepts are intrinsically public entities. Th at is because, pace 
Fodor but in keeping with Prinz’s (2004) proxytypes theory, wherein the ‘publicity’ 
constraint is relaxed,7 and Gärdenfors’ (2004) conceptual spaces theory, wherein con-
cepts are implied to have both a ‘public’ and a ‘private’ nature, I believe it is possible 
to talk about ‘the same’ concepts on at least four levels:8
6 Where a sign is an abstract entity that can take concrete expression. A road sign conveys a 
semiotic sign to the appropriately educated reader, but it is not, itself, a semiotic sign, merely 
its vehicle. 
7 In arguing for relaxing the publicity constraint, Prinz (2004: 158) writes, “If you and I agree 
about the most conspicuous walrus features, then we understand each other when we use the 
word ‘walrus’, and we engage in similar walrus-directed behaviors”. Note that, as the extended 
passage makes clear, Prinz clearly understands concepts to be (partly) comprised of beliefs.
8 Although it is common usage to talk about concepts both individually and collectively – all 
of the theories of concepts referenced in this paper take as their starting point that one can 
do so – nevertheless, some researchers have suggested (Woodfi eld 1994) or argued strongly 
(Machery 2009) that what one calls concepts in the two cases are quite diff erent things and 
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(1)  concepts for the individual, as shaped by personal experience;
(2)  concepts for the group, as shaped by collective experience;
(3)  concepts for the society, as shaped by collective experience on an even broader 
level;
(4)  concepts as (optionally) embodied in signs or lexicalized into the words of a 
language.
What this means is that  – in the language of conceptual spaces theory  – all sign-
using conceptual agents simultaneously occupy multiple conceptual spaces, which 
relate in complicated ways. If concepts change and develop – as I believe they do – 
then they do so on at least these levels.
1.3.2. Articulability
Likewise, though I have in earlier writings included it (Chrisley, Parthemore 2007), I 
did not include articulability: the idea that concepts are intrinsically communicable, 
which is usually taken to mean language, although conventionalized gesture could 
be included as well. As Colin Allen (1999: 39) writes, “Th e close connection of lan-
guage to concepts in humans has seduced many into thinking that the two notions 
of language and concepts cannot be disentangled”.
Th e idea that concepts require language  – which is generally taken to be an 
empirical rather than a stipulative claim  – is common currency among philoso-
phers of mind and language. I understand John McDowell (1996) as taking this 
line;9 Zoltan Torey goes further in making thought in general (Torey 2009: 46) and, 
indeed, mind itself (Torey 2009: 123) dependent on language; and Davidson (1987) 
takes a similar line. Although the later Wilfrid Sellars may well have moderated 
his views,10 the early Sellars (e.g. 1956) clearly took this position. Fodor does not 
explicitly endorse articulability in this sense, but he does tie language and concepts 
closely together, so that most simple concepts end up being lexical concepts; and his 
should go by diff erent names. At least within philosophy of mind, I consider this to be, 
however, the minority position. For Fodor, who has a strong publicity requirement, individual 
and collective concepts are (and must be) precisely the same; while, for Prinz and Gärdenfors 
and myself, they need not be.
9 I say this both because of the way McDowell describes language as bridging the divide 
between ‘mere animals’ (who lack concepts) and humans (see e.g. McDowell 1996: 125 and all 
of Lecture 6). Th e articulability requirement itself is given in passing in Lecture 1 (McDowell 
1996: 6). Note that McDowell is willing to attribute proto-concepts to some non-human agents, 
meaning, as I do, mental particulars that do not meet all of the conditions on being concepts.
10 de Vries, Willem 1987. Sellars, animals, and thought. Presentation to the Eastern Division 
of APA, December 1996: http://www.ditext.com/devries/sellanim.html (accessed 31 October 
2013).
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language of thought hypothesis (LOT; Fodor 2008, 1975) eff ectively makes structured 
thought into a language of its own.
I want to reject this received view for three reasons:
(1) With inspiration from Zlatev’s semiotic hierarchy – although Zlatev does not 
endorse this view! – as well as the close relation on most accounts between 
concepts and consciousness, I want to make the theoretical argument that con-
ceptually structured thought, in terms of all the desiderata listen in the opening 
paragraph, is logically prior to attempts at structured communication: either 
sign use or language.
(2) A growing weight of empirical evidence supports the view that pre-linguistic 
infants (see Section 2.3) and at least some non-linguistic species (see Section 
2.4.2) clearly have conceptual abilities.11 Such evidence aside, one wants to take 
care not to imply that, simply because we have no means of directly interrogat-
ing non-linguistic agents about their concepts, that they do not possess them.
(3) Separating concepts from communication makes it easier to tell a story of how 
conceptual abilities fi rst appear, either ontogenetically or phylogenetically, and 
how our concepts and conceptual frameworks evolve, without requiring lan-
guage from the beginning.
1.3.3. Change
One potentially controversial desideratum I have included is revisability/change. 
According to Fodor’s (2008) informational atomism theory of concepts, concepts do 
not change – indeed cannot, given that they are individuated strictly by their mind-
independent referent. A concept of ‘gold’ is a concept of ‘gold’ because – and only 
because – it refers to the metal gold. Although I have a very diff erent understanding 
of gold than the ancient Greeks did – I know about the periodic table for starters – 
nevertheless, I have precisely the same concept because it refers to precisely the same 
thing. For Fodor, concepts are constitutive of beliefs, but beliefs are in no way consti-
tutive of concepts.
Nevertheless, on most other accounts, and noting the questions raised by Andrew 
Woodfi eld (1994), concepts can and oft en do change, precisely because beliefs are 
(partly) constitutive of concepts, and not just the other way around. I have in mind 
in particular prototype theories (Rosch 1975, 1999) and their derivatives, including 
proxytypes theory and conceptual spaces theory, which assume that, since prototypes 
(appear to) change over time (or at least be open to such change), then concepts 
change as well. Th at said, I can think of no theory of concepts besides infor mational 
atomism that denies the possibility of conceptual change.
11 I will use the phrase “conceptual abilities” wherever my emphasis is on concepts-as-abilities 
rather than concepts-as-abstract-objects (i.e., the ‘building blocks’ of structured thought).
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However, I wish to make a much stronger claim, which I have articulated most 
completely in Parthemore 2013a: the apparently static nature of concepts is an 
illusion; concepts are in a state of constant and  – if oft en only incremental  – move-
ment and change. Th ey are in a constant state of – to borrow a turn of phrase from 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela12 – being brought forth as the conceptual 
agent interacts with her environment. Th ough their superfi cial appearance is of sta-
bility, their underlying nature is of fl uidity. As I argue in Parthemore 2013a, they 
must be this way because, at the same time that they must be able to apply across 
unboundedly many contexts, to do so they must adapt to fi t each new context  – 
since each new context is, in one way or another, unlike any that came before. So 
there is a tension and a balance between stability and change. Too much stability, 
and concepts cease to be relevant, because they cannot adapt; the conceptual frame-
works of which they form part cease to function as conceptual frameworks. Too 
much change, and the regularity that is their outward hallmark gets lost.
Th at principle – which lies at the heart of the Unifi ed Conceptual Space Th eory 
(Parthemore 2011a, 2013a, forthcoming; Parthemore, Morse 2010) – follows directly 
from that theory’s distinctive position as an enactive theory of concepts and the way 
in turn that enactivism (Varela et al. 1991; Th ompson 2007) gives a foundational 
role to interaction as a continuous process of adaptation and change, whereby both 
(experienced) agent and (experienced) environment are a product of that interac-
tion and cannot be traced back beyond it. Enactivism, too, gives a foundational role 
to perspective and to shift s in perspective. Sometimes the agent’s subjective experi-
ence is front and centre, with objective reality pushed into the background; other 
times objective reality is in the foreground, while the subjective and intersubjective 
element is pushed into the background or ignored altogether (but never entirely 
removed); both perspectives are necessary to get anything like a proper grasp on the 
interaction, which is foundational. Interaction being inherently dynamic  – never 
precisely the same from one moment to the next – it follows logically that the prod-
ucts of that interaction must also be constantly, if oft en imperceptibly, changing. 
On an enactive perspective, concepts are, like cognition more broadly, intrinsically 
interactive. Th eir reifi cation  – when we stop and refl ect on our concepts as con-
cepts – belies their underlying process-based, continuously updating nature.
On this picture, concepts  – like the agents who possess and employ them  – 
have a kind of lifecycle. Th ey are ‘born’ (there is, for example, a time on most 
accounts before a child has any concept of self or other or of object permanence); 
they develop into a kind of maturity whereby they achieve a relative stability (they 
12 “I have proposed the term enactive to… evoke the idea that what is known is brought 
forth, in contraposition to the more classical views of either cognitivism or connectionism” 
(Maturana, Varela 1992: 255).
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generally change much less and more slowly in adulthood than in childhood: e.g., 
one develops a stable notion of oneself relative to one’s social and physical surround-
ings); sometimes they cease to be useful and so ‘die’ (as a child, I had a much richer 
conceptual framework of “things lurking in my dark bedroom closet” than I do 
today13). In this paper, I talk about this conceptual lifecycle over the lifetime of both 
individuals and societies. Where one draws the lines – where one concept ‘ends’ and 
another ‘begins’ – is ultimately arbitrary. Unfortunately language confuses matters, 
because oft en people use the same word to express the ‘old’ concept as to express 
the ‘new’ one – as very nicely described by e.g. Th omas Kuhn (1990: 5) in compar-
ing the pre- and post-Copernican content of the lexical concept ‘planet’. What goes 
for ‘planet’ goes as well for such mundane concepts as ‘cup’ or ‘chair’. My adult con-
ceptualization of ‘cup’ both includes and excludes things that fell under cup for me 
as a child. Likewise consider my concept of ‘cup’ relative to that of, say, an ancient 
Roman, for whom a cup did not, presumably, include the possibility – never mind 
expectation – of a handle.
Given such a picture of concepts, it follows that understanding how they appear 
in the fi rst place and how they change over time requires shift ing focus between a 
number of diff erent time scales. Th ink of a camera fi rst zooming in then gradually 
zooming back out. In Section 2 I describe conceptual development on four time 
scales, roughly from the smallest to the largest. Since individuals generally have 
shorter lifespans than the groups of which they form a part, the shortest – and, at the 
same time, most highly paced – time scale will be that of the day-to-day life of indi-
vidual conceptual agents. Th e paper concludes with general discussion.
2. Multiple time scales
2.1. Time scale I: The life cycle of concepts in everyday 
use for the individual
Concepts – all concepts – have a beginning. Concepts are, if I am correct, in a pro-
cess of continuous if generally incremental change. Past a certain point, a concept 
may have changed so much as, eff ectively, to become a concept of something else; or 
it may get mentally fi led away as a historical relic, no longer actively a part of our 
conceptual frameworks.
Although, over the course of our lifetimes, we are in a continuous process of 
gaining new concepts and discarding old ones that are no longer useful (the personal 
equivalent of ‘phlogiston’ or ‘caloric’14), nevertheless, on a day-to-day basis, most of 
13 I off er further examples on the life cycle of concepts in the sections that follow.
14 Of course, these concepts still exist – or rather, the labels still do, and we have a fairly good 
idea of what people meant or thought they meant by them. But concepts of ‘phlogiston’ and 
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our concepts seem to be remarkably stable, even static – indeed, even necessarily so. 
What good is a concept of, say, ‘dog’ if it points to one thing one day and another 
thing the next? Nevertheless, the seeming fi xedness of concepts, once we acquire 
them, is arguably but a product of two things: the relatively slow rate of change of 
most concepts, most of the time; and our lack of attention to that change. One might 
usefully draw a comparison here with the phenomenon of change blindness, where – 
in one version of the phenomenon – change that is suffi  ciently slow and continuous 
fails to grasp our attention.15 Consider e.g. a shirt that changes from red to blue over 
the course of many minutes. In both instances, incremental change fails to register as 
change at all – even when the cumulative eff ect is quite dramatic. Only when one is 
confronted with that cumulative change (a ‘before’ and ‘aft er’ picture as it were) is it 
suddenly blatantly clear.
As I describe in Parthemore, Morse 2010, the causal relationship between con-
cepts and experience, for the individual conceptual agent, is not linear but circular. 
Experience gives rise to concepts, which, in turn, structure experience: neither is 
primary. Although something must logically start off  the process – i.e., somewhere 
there is a linear story to be told – once it is underway, it is impossible for the con-
ceptual agent to step outside the circle, to see things ‘as they really are’. Putting this 
another way, concepts do not exist in isolation but only as parts of a larger concep-
tual framework. When new concepts are ‘born’, they arise within an existing con-
ceptual framework that surrounds and supports them; when they ‘die’, it is to that 
framework they return (i.e., many of the concepts that made possible their emer-
gence remain even aft er they themselves are gone).16
Consider the concept ‘tesseract’. I was introduced to it by my Th ird Grade 
teacher, who read Madeleine L’Engle’s A Wrinkle in Time (2012[1962]) aloud to the 
class. I understood that it somehow meant a ‘four-dimensional’ cube with an ‘extra’ 
dimension beyond length, width, and height, at right angles to each of the fi rst 
three  – the fi nal right angle being one I could imagine but not perceive. I under-
stood this, in part, because I had a basic grasp of geometry: of ‘regular’ plane fi gures 
‘caloric’ no longer form an active part of most people’s conceptual frameworks, unless they are 
studying history of science. 
15 For a good review of both the associated phenomena and contemporary ways of account-
ing for them, see Noë 2007.
16 Once again, Fodor (2008: 54) takes a diff erent view, at least when it comes to lexical 
concepts: “It’s plausible prima facie that “a” might refer to a even if there are no other symbols. 
Th e whole truth about a language might be that its only well-formed expression is “John” and 
that “John” refers to John. I do think that uncorrupted intuition supports this sort of view; the 
fact that “John” refers to John doesn’t seem to depend on… such facts as that “dog” refers to 
dogs”. Note that for Fodor, rather like Allen Newell and Herbert Simon’s physical symbol system 
hypothesis (Newell 1980), concepts are physical symbols in the brain.
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and ‘perfect’ solids, of points and lines and 
dimensions, of right angles, and so on.
It was not until some time in high 
school that I understood in what way 
a tesseract is to a cube as a cube is to a 
square: namely, that just as a cube has six 
faces, all of which are squares, a tesser-
act has eight ‘hyperfaces’, all of which are 
cubes. As viewed in three or (even more 
so) two dimensions, the cubes look greatly 
distorted (see Figure 1); but they are all, in 
fact, identical.
On a day-to-day basis, my ‘tesseract’ 
concept does not change noticeably at all, 
most of the time. (Once in a while it does, 
though, as when I learned to relate tesser-
acts to hyperspheres.) At the same time, each time I employ the concept, it must 
adapt at least a little to fi t the circumstances: say, if I need to explain it to a ten-year-
old (as I have done) or build myself a 3D model of its ‘shadow’ out of toothpicks and 
gumdrops (as I have also done) or decide to list all its properties that I know about 
(prompting me to discover new ones).
At some point, some clever mathematician may convince me that, in fact, tesser-
acts are not theoretically possible aft er all; or may teach me so much about them that 
my ‘tesseract’ concept becomes a concept of… something else, at which point the 
original concept is obsolete, even if the new concept hangs by the same lexical label.
2.2. Time scale II: The life cycle of concepts in everyday use for society
Societies usefully can be, and oft en are, described as having lifespans of their own: so 
e.g. one talks of the ‘birth’ of the Roman republic or the ‘fall’ of Rome. Just as, over the 
course of human lifetimes, individual conceptual agents are in a continuous process 
of gaining new concepts and discarding old ones; so, over the course of their own 
lifetimes, societies are engaged in an analogous process of creation and destruction.
If the ‘tesseract’ concept was ‘born’ for me in Th ird Grade, that was possible only 
because it already existed for the society of which I was and am a part, having fi l-
tered its way down from abstract mathematics to children’s literature. Although 
it is hard to ascertain just how old the concept is  – if that question even makes 
sense given the discussion above  – its ‘invention’ or ‘discovery’ is usually attrib-
uted to Ludwig Schläfl i, working in the mid-19th century, who proved that there 
are six such ‘perfect’ hypersolids, corresponding to the fi ve ‘perfect’ solids of three 
Figure 1. Projection of a tesseract into two 
dimensions. Downloaded from Wiki media 
Commons (http://commons.wikimedia.org) 
and reproduced under the Creative Com-
mons license.
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dimensions – tetrahedron, cube, octahedron, dodecahedron, and icosahedron – of 
which all but the dodecahedron were known by the ancient Greeks. Its lexicaliza-
tion is attributed to Charles Howard Hinton (1888). In general, the life cycle of the 
societal concept of ‘tesseract’ is stretched out relative to its lifecycle at the level of me 
or any other individual, given the way that various mathematicians, acting as part of 
a mathematical community, have added at one time or another to our shared under-
standing of it.
What is, at the level of individual agents, couched in the language of psychology 
in terms of belief revision is, at the societal level, oft en couched in the language of 
philosophy in terms of the so-called history of ideas. Th ere have been recent attempts 
to bring the two discussions together: notably Olsson, Enqvist 2010. Erik Olsson and 
Sebastian Enqvist write in the introduction in the introduction:
Belief revision theory and philosophy of science both aspire to shed light on the 
dynamics of knowledge – on how our view of the world changes (typically) in the 
light of new evidence. Yet these two areas of research have long seemed strangely 
detached from each other, as witnessed by the small number of cross-references 
and researchers working in both domains […]. One factor may be that while belief 
revision theory has traditionally been pursued in a bottom-up manner, focusing 
on the endeavors of single inquirers, philosophers of science, inspired by logi-
cal empiricism, have tended to be more interested in science as a multi-agent or 
agent-independent phenomenon. (Olsson, Enqvist 2010: v)
Once again, enactivism, with its insistence on a fl exible and negotiable boundary 
between self and other or self and society (or self and world)17 – as a useful, even 
necessary, conceptual distinction but with no commitment to any prior ontological 
one (Parthemore 2011b)  – suggests that both perspectives (individual and collec-
tive – but also bottom up and top down) are needed for anything like a complete pic-
ture. Th e individual’s lifespan takes place in the context of the lifespan of the society 
of which she forms a part; meanwhile, the lifespan of the society is only meaningful 
relative to the lifespan of its many individual members.
2.3. Time scale III: Over the lifetime of the individual
Once one steps back from the typical day-to-day life of an individual to consider her 
lifespan, two additional aspects of conceptual change come to the fore: how the indi-
vidual’s conceptual frameworks get started in the fi rst place – assuming that she is 
17  Although Andy Clark is not considered an enactive philosopher, his and David Chalmers’ 
Extended Mind Hypothesis has, in many ways, a similar inspiration. Clark writes of “profoundly 
embodied agents” (2008: 34) such that “such agents are able constantly to negotiate and 
renegotiate the agent-world boundary itself ”.
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not born with them – and what happens when not just individual concepts become 
obsolete but entire conceptual frameworks break down.
A caveat is in order, particularly with regard to conceptual genesis, given the 
earlier claim that no conceptual agent can set aside her conceptual nature, even 
for a moment, to see her (or anyone else’s) concepts ‘as they really are’; no concep-
tual agent can step outside the circular causal loop that is concepts and experience. 
Th erefore, any account one off ers of the origins of the very fi rst conceptual frame-
works one possesses must have something of the ‘just so’ story about it; the most 
one can say of the story is that it is logically plausible and that it fi ts the available evi-
dence, though it almost certainly over-intellectualizes matters and otherwise distorts 
things through an inevitably conceptually biased perspective, because researchers 
are unavoidably conceptual agents. Nevertheless, it provides a place to start.
2.3.1. Not innate concepts, but innate protoconcepts
One need not go so far as a Fodor-inspired nativism to think that some concepts, 
at least, are with us from the very start of life18; so e.g. Stevan Harnad writes (1990: 
2): “clearly, no organism is born a blank slate. Some categories are innate” – a posi-
tion that such researchers in early childhood development as Colwyn Trevarthen 
(e.g. Trevarthen 2012) are clearly inclined toward as well. On such a view, nothing 
is required to get the conceptual framework building going, because the initial con-
ceptual framework is already there.
As I argued previously in Parthemore 2013a, I wish to take a diff erent approach: 
one that presupposes an initial framework (or, if you will, mechanism), but not a 
properly conceptual one. Th e idea is that conceptual frameworks depend on certain 
innate19 proto-concepts (or, if you will, protoconceptual abilities) to get going, along 
with certain ‘rules’ about how they may join together or be pulled apart. Th ese then 
delimit the structure of all the conceptual frameworks that follow, biasing conceptual 
agents to look at the world in certain ways and not in others. UCST suggests these 
are three:
(1)  proto-object: a something; or: the ability to recognize a something as a some-
thing, roughly corresponding to the English language category of ‘noun’;
(2)  proto-action/event: a happening; or: the ability to recognize a happening as a 
happening, roughly corresponding to the English language category of ‘verb’;
18  Fodor is widely understood as a radical nativist, for whom many if not most of our concepts 
are innate. Th at said, what exactly he means by that nativism is far from straightforwardly clear 
(see e.g. Prinz 2004: 230) and seems to have evolved over the years as well (Fodor 1975, 2008).
19 I mean ‘innate’ roughly in the sense of ‘with us from birth’ and leave aside for now the 
question of whether this innateness is genetic or gestational or something else again.
 Conceptual change and development on multiple time scales  205
(3)  proto-property: a ‘_____ is like this’; or: the ability to recognize a ‘_____ is 
like this’ as a ‘_____ is like this’, roughly corresponding to the English lan-
guage categories of ‘adjective’ and ‘adverb’.
Putting this another way, agents who are or have the capacity to become concep-
tual agents are ‘pre-confi gured’ to see the world in terms of (abstract or concrete) 
objects, actions or events involving those objects,20 and properties that these objects, 
actions, and events possess. Every human language can express these ideas, regard-
less of whether or not it has the corresponding grammatical categories to noun, verb, 
and adjective/adverb; and, with a little care, all ideas can be traced back to one of 
these three categories. If it seems that one must view the world in this way, it need 
not be because of any prior ontological structure in the world but only because, the 
proto-conceptual structure being innate and therefore presupposed, it cannot be 
questioned, let alone set aside.
Such entities are not concepts proper because they fail to meet all the desiderata 
off ered in the opening of the paper. In particular, being innate, they are not under the 
agent’s endogenous control, nor are they subject to revision; and they are too few in 
number to be, of themselves, productive.
Th e proposal is that, given the appropriate environment and the appropriate inter-
actions with that environment, these protoconcepts give rise to the most richly struc-
tured of conceptual frameworks. To do so, something else is required: what I have 
loosely referred to above as ‘rules’. By this I mean another set of entities, which are 
neither proto-conceptual nor conceptual but rather connect (or ‘glue’) protoconcepts 
and, later, concepts together, describing how they relate. Th ese connectors provide 
the innate foundations for the comparable relations in informal language and for-
mal logic, which at the same time they need to be distinguished from, lacking the 
conceptual baggage and the linguistic and logic-based commitments attached to the 
latter. Th ey should initially consist of a version of ‘and’ (parts go together to make a 
[new] whole, where order does not matter), ‘then’ (parts go together to make a [new] 
whole, where order does matter), ‘xor’ (what previously appeared as a uniform whole 
is divided into distinct parts, or one faces a choice point between two mutually exclu-
sive paths),21 and ‘equals’ (what previously were taken to be two distinct entities or 
mutually exclusive paths are made or shown to be the same entity/path).
20 ‘Actions’ I mean in the conventional sense of being “intentional under some description” 
(Davidson 1980: 50) (i.e., by an agent), as opposed to other sorts of events, which are ‘mere 
happenings’: a tree branch snaps, a volcano erupts; one does not assume that either the tree or 
the volcano in any way chose to do these things. Davidson is the standard reference here, and 
I defer to his notion of agency.
21  ‘Ior’ can be derived by combining ‘xor’ with ‘and’.
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Protoconcepts and connectors join together to defi ne, in UCST, an emergent 
and divergent space of spaces: a unifi ed space bringing together all the many con-
ceptual spaces (colour conceptual space, tone conceptual space, etc.) that any given 
conceptual agent possesses, where each subspace constitutes a particular conceptual 
domain, defi ned by a set of integral dimensions (e.g., ‘colour’ has the integral dimen-
sions of ‘hue’, ‘saturation’, and ‘brightness’, ‘tone’ the integral dimensions of ‘volume’ 
and ‘pitch’) and a pre-determined metric.22 Th at is to say, protoconcepts and proto-
connectors together constitute both a defi ning algorithm and simultaneously a geom-
etry for the unifi ed space. Th e unifi ed space is the conceptual agent’s primary concep-
tual framework: the foundational domain to all the conceptual domains with which 
she is conversant.23
If one takes this ‘just so’-like story as a starting point, the question remains how 
exactly one gets from starting point to ‘fi nal’ product: from proto-concepts to fully 
fl edged concepts via (according to UCST; see especially Parthemore 2014) a succes-
sion of sensorimotor engagements. Phrased another way, the question becomes, ‘how 
can we generalize from single observations to general laws?’ (Gärdenfors 2004: 205) 
or, more broadly, from individual sensorimotor experiences to (necessarily general) 
concepts. Th e process is – so Gärdenfors implies – largely driven by induction.
One might describe it more precisely as an iterated process of pattern recog-
nition/extraction/imposition (my inspiration here is Dennett 1991) driven by some 
initially minimal notion of salience grounded, probably, in the survival of the organ-
ism.24 Th rough repeated iterations, the agent moves from patterns to patterns of pat-
terns to patterns of patterns of patterns, and from the sensorimotorly concrete to the 
increasingly abstract. With each iteration, the agent steps further back from the pre-
sent moment, and the moment itself – i.e., the minimally individuable unit of time – 
becomes both increasingly discretized and elongated. In the language of conceptual 
spaces theory or UCST, it is the progressive partitioning and re-partitioning of an 
initially minimally partitioned conceptual space.
Partly for the reasons given at the start of this section, research on innate and 
early-childhood conceptual mechanisms remains at best preliminary and highly con-
troversial. Th e general consensus in the child development literature is that the self/
22 Pre-determined by the agent based on its salience needs: i.e., what level of detail is useful. 
Without going into further detail, note that the metric might reasonably be discrete or 
continuous. Note that Gärdenfors (personal communication) acknowledges that the notion 
of a unifi ed space of spaces is implicit in conceptual spaces theory but has not yet come to a 
preferred description of it for himself. 
23 For details on UCST, see Parthemore  2010, 2011, 2013. Th e algorithm is specifi ed most 
fully in Parthemore forthcoming.
24 See e.g. Th ompson, Stapleton 2009, though the idea of grounding salience in survival of the 
organism is common currency in the enactive community.
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other (or self/non-self or self/world) distinction – I take the three to be more or less 
equivalent – is both one of the very fi rst conceptual distinctions children make and 
one of the most foundational to all that follow, even as it continues to evolve. Other 
concepts, such as object permanence, likewise come quite early: Jean Piaget (1954) 
famously located it at nine months; Renée Baillargeon (1987) has claimed evidence 
for it at less than half that age. Children have a well-documented tendency to over-
generalize (probably by under-specifi cation):25 e.g., to apply ‘dog’ to non-dogs; over 
time though, they increasingly bring their own developing conceptual frameworks 
into alignment with the societies of which they are part. I take it as consistent with the 
child development literature that:
 children possess concepts before they are able to express them;
 children are able to express concepts through gesture before they can do so 
through language;
 children are able to express concepts appropriately through language before 
they are able to refl ect on them rather than their objects.
2.3.2. Radical re-conceptualization
At the other end of life, one not infrequently fi nds what appears to be the wholesale 
disintegration of conceptual frameworks in advanced cases of dementia, when cogni-
tive abilities in general are breaking down. Of more interest for present purposes are 
those occasions at various points in one’s life where, in not quite such a wholesale but 
still substantive fashion, conceptual frameworks break down – and get replaced by 
something new, a process I have elsewhere (Parthemore 2013b) called radical re-con-
ceptualization as the individual-agent-level version of what Kuhn (1970, 1990) called 
paradigm shift s: the wholesale replacement of one conceptual framework by another.26
25 See the discussion in Gärdenfors 2004: 125.
26 Without recapitulating the argument from the earlier paper, suffi  ce to say here that I do 
not take the two processes of conceptual change – for the (scientifi c) community and for the 
individual – to be merely analogous (as one of my anonymous reviewers understood it, and 
as some would have it: e.g., Greiff enhagen, Sherman 2006) but, indeed, one and the same 
process. Th is is in general keeping with my position that concepts can be described on multiple 
levels: for the individual, for the community, and for the society. Note that Greiff enhagen and 
Sherman – who consider the “analogy” to be a false one – are talking specifi cally about the 
application of Kuhn’s paradigm shift s to understanding the teaching of science in the school 
classroom. Th eir concerns are ultimately specifi c to that context and so do not, I believe, apply 
here. Note that I am not interested here in everything that Kuhn has to say about paradigm 
shift s – much of it is irrelevant to my purposes – only that part that relates to conceptual change 
and replacement of conceptual frameworks.
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Concepts allow us to interact with the world in a wholly diff erent way than agents 
without concepts, even as they remove us from life “fully in the moment”. Th ey sim-
plify the world in order to make it approachable:
Th e prime problem is that the information received by the receptors is too rich 
and too unstructured. What is needed is some way of transforming and organizing 
the input into a mode that can be handled on the conceptual or symbolic level. 
Th is basically involves fi nding a more economic form of representation […]. 
(Gärdenfors 2004: 221).
At the same time, what Gärdenfors (2004: 221) goes on to call “a reduction in the 
number of dimensions that are represented” is not just a loss of potential informa-
tion but of alternate understandings. Th at is because, even as concepts simplify, 
they increasingly bind us into one way of looking at the world: conceptual devel-
opment constitutes a series of choice points to go down one path and not another. 
Each choice constrains subsequent choices – a propagation of constraints narrowing 
one in on a particular and precise view on the world to the exclusion of all others. 
Alternate views become impossible because previous choice points have ruled them 
out. Conceptual frameworks, were they never challenged – if there were not some 
mechanism to sweep away some of the structure periodically  – would eventually 
grind to a halt, the conceptual equivalent of painting oneself into a corner.
In practice, conceptual frameworks get challenged in lesser or greater ways, the 
greater ways tending toward what I have called radical re-conceptualization. As 
Etzel Cardeña (2011) suggests, conceptual frameworks can be replaced temporar-
ily through certain altered states of consciousness; it can happen more permanently 
through such “life changing” events as mid-life crises and religious experiences, 
where a period of initial confusion, as long-held assumptions get discarded, is fol-
lowed by one of creative conceptual growth.
Per Lind (2013) writes how the Greek Pyrrhonists, with their emphatic rejection 
of dogmatism or any other rigid way of thinking, deliberately set up cognitive con-
fl icts for themselves and sought out contradictions in themselves so as to induce this 
kind of breakdown over and over again ad infi nitum. Of course, it is never possi-
ble, never mind desirable, to throw everything out and start over; the trick is know-
ing what to discard and what to keep.27 Th is capacity for renewal and re-invention is 
what we celebrate, I think, when e.g. an 85-year-old man takes up body building28 or 
27 Needless to say, I speak metaphorically here. Radical reconceptualization should not be 
taken, most of the time, as a consciously deliberative process: to the contrary. Unlike the 
Pyrrhonists, who deliberately set out to sabotage their own conceptual frameworks, for most 
people most radical breakdowns in and restructurings of conceptual frameworks are probably 
not planned for.
28 http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/apr/02/i-am-a-90-year-old-bodybuilder.
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when a man approaching his 98th birthday skydives for the fi rst time in his life only 
to say “it was the fi rst time but it won’t be the last”.29 
2.4. Time scale IV: Over the lifetime of a society and the species
In the context of any given society, one cannot really talk about the origins of con-
cepts in general or of conceptual frameworks. Every society, it seems, inherits these 
from the societies that came before – except, of course, that some society (or proto-
society?) logically had to have come fi rst. One can, on the other hand, talk about the 
societal equivalent of radical re-conceptualization: Kuhn’s paradigm shift s. Given the 
comparative time scales, I will discuss these fi rst and conceptual origins last.
2.4.1. Paradigm shift s in the society and the species
Once again, I set aside the possibility of conceptual collapse  – the stuff  of science 
fi ction – whereby one or another society or the entire human species abandons its 
conceptual commitments altogether and ‘reverts’ to the status of ‘wild beasts’, like 
the Sleestak of a certain science fi ction television series. Such possibilities exist, for 
now, only in the realm of speculation; whereas the (partial) collapse and replacement 
of conceptual frameworks at the societal level – the societal equivalent, if you will, 
of sudden eureka-style revelation or mid-life crisis – is very well documented (see 
below).
As said, I relate radical re-conceptualization to Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shift , 
which was aimed, in the fi rst instance, not at society in general but at the scientifi c 
community, even though Kuhn would readily allow, I think, that there is no sharp 
dividing line between the two, and that what starts as a paradigm shift  for the scien-
tifi c community fi lters out over time (and with some distortions) to the wider soci-
ety. Kuhn is keen to stress, at least in his later work (e.g. Kuhn 1990), that the incom-
mensurability between old and new can never be complete incommensurability; 
indeed, anything even remotely close to ‘complete’ incommensurability would pre-
vent any comparisons whatsoever of old to new – and any confusions. Confusions 
arise precisely because the incommensurability is partial – because there is overlap 
between old and new  – because some of the new concepts go by old names, and 
some of the concepts that carry over from old to new are radically changed. As Kuhn 
(1990: 4) writes, “pace the causal theorists of reference,30 ‘water’ did not always refer 
to H20”. He continues:
29 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/7983045.stm.
30 Th is includes Fodor, of course.
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[…] I’ve elsewhere pointed out […] that the content of the Copernican statement, 
‘planets travel around the sun’, cannot be expressed in a statement that invokes the 
celestial taxonomy of the Ptolemaic statement, ‘planets travel around the earth’. 
Th e diff erence between the two statements is not simply one of fact. Th e term 
‘planet’ appears as a kind term in both, and the two kinds overlap in membership 
without either’s containing all the celestial bodies contained in the other. (Kuhn 
1990: 5)31
In similar fashion, Hanne Andersen and Nancy J. Nersessian (2000: S239) note, in 
analysing the paradigm shift  from Maxwell’s to Einstein’s electrodynamics, “despite 
major conceptual change, there is still signifi cant continuity between the Maxwellian 
and the Einsteinian concepts of fi eld”. So, the radical change of a paradigm shift , like 
that of radical re-conceptualization, is complementary to and continuous with more 
incremental change.
Not infrequently, paradigm shift s for one or another society become paradigm 
shift s for the species. Certainly that would seem to be the case in the contemporary 
world, with its realization  – with technical achievements well beyond anything he 
lived to see  – of what Marshall McLuhan (1962) termed the global village, where 
near-simultaneous communications make possible a society of societies: a single 
common society of which all human societies and all human beings are a part.
As the Pyrrhonists would surely agree, the result of successive paradigm shift s 
might, but need not, move either society or species closer to ‘truth’ in any absolute, 
atemporal sense. Conceptual frameworks, like scientifi c hypotheses, may even be 
assumed to be wrong in that sense, based on the limitations of human cognition 
and perspective – a position in philosophy of science with which Albert Einstein is 
strongly associated (see e.g. Stachel 1982: 96), and which is in keeping as well with 
the enactive perspective, with its inclination to see ‘truth’ as a moving target, ulti-
mately and intimately bound up with its historical and cultural context.
Some of the best research on societal paradigm shift s comes from cultural and 
social anthropology. Consider the work of Napoleon Chagnon among the Yano mamö 
of Brazil (Chagnon 1968[1966]), for whom Chagnon was, at the time of his initial 
contact, the fi rst ‘white’ man the Yanomamö tribes he contacted had ever seen. In the 
space of a few decades, their world has changed for them almost beyond recognition.
Some of the best research, arguably, was done in the late Colonial period, as 
the British Empire was beginning to collapse, and a generation of anthropologists 
examined the oft en dramatic and not infrequently tragic eff ects that colonialism had 
had: e.g., E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s work among the Azande (1937) or Mary Douglas’ 
31 Note how, in addition to the main point Kuhn is making, this can be taken to highlight the 
distinction I made earlier between the shared concepts of a society and the words by which 
they become lexicalized.
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among the Lele of the Kasai (1963). Also worth noting is Douglas’ (1966) reporting 
on the millennial cargo cults of Melanesia, with their peculiar juxtaposition of a call 
for a return to traditional values and a prediction of massive wealth in the form of 
Western consumer goods to be divinely bestowed on them.
2.4.2. Conceptual origins in the species
Such classic anthropology studies, though oft en controversial – not least Chagnon’s – 
mean that society-wide paradigm shift s are, in many cases, well documented. Th e 
same cannot be said of the origins of the fi rst concepts and conceptual frameworks. 
As with the individual, only much more so, the story one may tell, though empiri-
cally informed where possible, will, despite all the protestations of someone like 
William Th omas Polger (2007), necessarily bear all the hallmarks of the ‘just so’ 
story. Aft er all, the human species has not been around long enough to observe the 
origin of concepts/conceptual abilities in other species, nor does anyone have a time 
machine with which to confront our own conceptual origins fi rst hand.
Here, the guiding principle might best be that ontogeny need not recapitulate 
phylogeny: what the individual need not re-invent it generally does not. Th is implies 
that the origin of concepts in the species represents a much bigger cognitive leap 
than for the individual, who is born into the embrace of her society’s conceptual 
frameworks.
If one takes the four stages of Merlin Donald’s (1993, 2001) model of cognitive-
cultural evolution  – episodic (episode-driven), mimetic (gesture-driven), mythic 
(oral-language-driven), and theoretic (written-language-driven)  – as a starting 
point, as I am inclined to do, then, it seems, the requirements of even the fi rst of 
the four stages, which Donald sees us as sharing with the higher primates, already 
well exceed the requirements for conceptually structured thought laid out in the 
introduction. Aft er all, episodic cognition, with its capacity to tie objects and events 
together into complex structures comprising concrete episodes, presupposes that 
one has concepts for those objects and events in the fi rst place. It has the strikingly 
dual nature of being both specifi c to a particular spatiotemporal context and aff ord-
ing new ways of generalizing by relating the objects and actions that make up that 
context in fl exible ways that agents without episodic cognition are unable to do. It is 
the diff erence between seeing a tree as a tree and seeing a tree as a tree in the wider 
context of agents and actions involving that tree on a given occasion: e.g., climbing a 
tree to avoid a predator that has suddenly appeared from the undergrowth.
Episodic memory is, as the name implies, memory for specifi c episodes in life, that 
is, events with a specifi c time-space locus. Th us, we can remember the specifi cs of 
an experience: the place, the weather, the colors and smells, the voices of the past 
[…]. Such memories are rich in specifi c perceptual content. By defi nition, episodes 
are bound in time and space to specifi c dates and places. (Donald 1993: 150)
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Th e requirements for conceptual cognition, as I have laid them out, are rather more 
modest: systematicity, productivity, compositionality, Kantian spontaneity, and 
revisability. Behaviourally, these translate into evidence of an ability to derive general 
classes from specifi c perceptual instances, apply these classes to novel situations in 
a fl exible manner suggestive of some at least implicit refl ective capacity, and express 
surprise when the consequent expectations go wrong (Newen, Bartels 2007: 291; 
Allen 1999: 37): none of which, on the face of it, require episodic cognition, let alone 
human-style language. If all this is right, then one should expect to fi nd evidence of 
conceptually structured thought in a variety of non-human species – and indeed, as 
an accumulating body of evidence in the fi eld of comparative cognition is driving 
home, one does.
Albert Newen and Andreas Bartels (2007) cite the parrot Alex (Pepperberg 1999) 
and the bonobo Kanzi (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1998). If one complains that these 
are case studies rather than controlled experiments, or that they involve linguistically 
enculturated agents who have developed some limited capacity for human language, 
then one can turn to the studies of scrub jays (Clayton, Dickinson 1998; Raby et al. 
2007) and ravens (Bugnyar, Kotrschal 2002) who, through a series of carefully con-
trolled experiments, show sophisticated fl exibility in their caching habits. Ravens, 
furthermore, show sensitivity to the perspectives of others, including agents not of 
their species (Bugnyar 2011) and can seemingly adapt their behaviour to social con-
text (Bugnyar, Heinrich 2006). Meanwhile, Santino, a chimp at Furuvik Zoo north of 
Stockholm, has, over the past ten years, shown an increasingly sophisticated pattern 
of projectile caching and throwing behaviour temporally removed from each other 
(Osvath 2009, 2010), culminating most recently in a pattern of hiding the projectiles 
under piles of hay and behind logs from the viewpoint of the zoo visitors who are the 
intended targets (Osvath, Karvonen 2012).
Although all of this is circumstantial evidence at best, nevertheless it does sug-
gest that conceptual abilities are very possibly signifi cantly older in the human line-
age than the human species itself. Such removal in time makes speculation about 
their origins all the more speculative. Nevertheless, Gärdenfors and Osvath (2010) 
provide what might prove to be a useful pointer in the right direction, in suggesting 
the origins of anticipatory cognition  – which exceeds the requirements of episodic 
cognition – in the Oldowan culture of 1.5–2.6 million years ago, driven by selective 
pressures in their ecological niche: in particular, the replacement of rain forest by 
savannah in relation to the then-developing ice age, forcing the Oldowan culture to 
move from a vegetarian to an omnivorous diet and collect their food from a much 
wider range of sources over a much wider area in a way that required advance plan-
ning and group coordination.
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4. Summary and discussion
Taking what I take to be a standard approach to the properties of concepts, bar any 
requirement for articulability, this paper has understood concepts as prior to signs 
(on a narrow reading of signs), themselves prior to (human-style) language. Th is is 
not a thousand miles away from Zlatev’s notion of a semiotic hierarchy. It has argued, 
pace Fodor but per the enactive perspective, that concepts are not only subject to 
change but in a state of continuous if oft en only incremental and easily ignorable 
motion. It has compared and contrasted conceptual change on four diff erent time 
scales, from the day-to-day life of an individual conceptual agent at one end to the 
lifetime of a society and the species at the other. It has argued that certain limita-
tions on human cognition prevent us from off ering a defi nitive account of the ori-
gin of concepts and conceptual frameworks in childhood, while an account of their 
origins in the species is several orders more speculative. Nevertheless, by compar-
ing the conceptual abilities of human beings to other species, we can hope to gain 
some insights into when and how those origins might have occurred and what the 
fi rst conceptual frameworks might have looked like. As Donald (1998: 185) writes, 
“Humans are undoubtedly unique in their spontaneous invention of language and 
symbols; but, as I have argued elsewhere […] our special advantage is more on the 
production side than on the conceptual side of the ledger. Animals know much more 
than they can express”.32
Th e consequences for understanding signs on either a broad or narrow reading 
are clear. On a very broad reading, the change and development of concepts just is 
the change and development of signs, cast in a slightly diff erent light. On a narrower 
reading, such as I prefer, the change and development of concepts, as prior to and 
integral to the foundation of signs, can be expected signifi cantly to inform the pro-
cess of sign development, off ering important clues to the semioticians.
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Изменение и развитие концептов на разных временных шкалах: 
от постепенной эволюции до происхождения
В контексте отношений между знаками и понятиями данная статья рассматривает неко-
торые противоречия в вопросах развития и изменения понятий. Автор исходит из того, 
что понятия возникают в языке и что их можно рассматривать как минимум на четырех 
уровнях: уровень отдельного агента, сообщества, общества и языка. В соответствии с 
энактивной философской традициией утверждается, что понятия не только открыты 
для изменения уже по своей сущности, но что вместе с окружающими их контекстами 
они находятся в состоянии постоянного, хотя и медленного изменения. Чтобы понятия 
эффективно работали в качестве понятий нужно, чтобы они были, с одной стороны, 
стабильными, a с другой – достаточно гибкими для приспобления к новым контекстам. 
В статье сравниваются и сопоставляются развитие и изменение понятий на четырех 
разных временных шкалах: в обыденной жизни концептуального агента, в жизни обще-
ства, в течении всей жизни отдельного aгента и в течении эволюции человека как вида. 
Основной вывод статьи гласит, что связь между понятиями и индивидуальным или 
коллективным опытом основывается на линеарной, а не на циркулярной каузальности. 
Mõistete muutumine ja areng mitmetel ajaskaaladel: 
järk-järgulisest evolutsioonist päritoluni
Märkide ja mõistete vahelise suhte kontekstis tegeldakse käesolevas artiklis mõnede kest-
vate vastuoludega mõistete arengu ja muutuse vallas – kaasa arvatud väited, et mõned mõis-
ted ei allugi korrigeerimisele. Lähtutakse seisukohast, et mõisted tulenevad keelest ja et neid 
on võimalik käsitleda vähemalt neljal tasandil: üksiktegutseja, kogukonna, ühiskonna ja 
keele tasandil. Vastuokslikumalt väidetakse ka, et mõisted pole üksnes olemuslikult avatud 
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korrigeerimisele, vaid et koos raamistikega, millesse need kuuluvad, on need pideva, ehkki 
vähehaaval aset leidva, muutuse seisundis: seisukoht, mis tuleneb otseselt enaktiivsest tradit-
sioonist fi losoofi as. Et mõisted oleksid mõistetena tõhusad, tuleb neis saavutada hoolikas tasa-
kaal, et need oleksid piisavalt stabiilsed, olemaks rakendatavad sobivalt paljudes kontekstides, 
ja teisalt piisavalt paindlikud, et kohaneda iga uue kontekstiga. Selle artikli panus seisneb mõis-
tete arengu ja muutuse võrdlemises ja vastandamises neljal ajaskaalal: kontseptuaalse üksiktoi-
mija igapäevaelus, ühiskonna igapäevaelus, üksiktoimija elu vältel ja ühiskonna ning inimeste 
kui liigi elu vältel. Jõutakse järeldusele, et mõistete ja (individuaalse või kollektiivse) kogemuse 
vahelises sidemes valitseb lineaarne ja mitte tsirkulaarne kausaalsus.
